		1
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
3		
4	KEVIN BRANCA, INDIVIDUALLY) AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS) CASE NO. 14CV2062-MMA(AGS)	
5	SIMILARLY SITUATED,	
6	PLAINTIFF,) SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA) WEDNESDAY,	
7	VS.) JUNE 14, 2017) 2:00 P.M.	
8	NORDSTROM, INC.,	
9	DEFENDANT.)	
10	/	
11		
12	TRANSCRIPT OF DISCOVERY HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANDREW G. SCHOPLER	
13	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
14	APPEARANCES:	
15	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: KOPELOWITZ, OSTROW, FERGUSON	
16	WEISELBERG, GILBERT BY: ARI ROBERT KAUFMAN, ESQ.	
17	2800 PONCE DE LEON BOULEVARD SUITE 1100	
18	CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134	
19	FOR THE DEFENDANT: SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON BY: SHANNA M. PEARCE, ESQ.	
20	12275 EL CAMINO REAL SUITE 200	
21	SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92130	
22	TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: AVI ROBERT KAUFMAN, ESQ.	
23	TRANSCRIBER: CAMERON P. KIRCHER	
24	PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING; TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY TRANSCRIPTION.	
25		

2.

STILL BE DEFICIENT, IN THAT UNDER RULE 33(B), IT'S REQUIRED THAT THEY NOTARIZE OR VERIFY NOT ONLY THE IDENTITY OF THE SIGNATORY BUT ALSO THE TRUTH OF THE RESPONSES.

AND IN THIS CASE, IT APPEARS THAT, BELATEDLY, THE IDENTITY OF THE SIGNATORY WAS NOTARIZED BUT NOT THE TRUTH OF THE RESPONSES. SO AS I SAID, ON THIS BASIS I COULD GRANT THE MOTION OUTRIGHT I THINK ON THAT PROCEDURAL GROUND.

PLAINTIFF ALSO RAISES A PROCEDURAL OBSTACLE HERE,
WHICH IS THAT NORDSTROM FAILED TO MEANINGFULLY MEET AND
CONFER ABOUT THIS DISPUTE BEFORE BRINGING IT TO THE COURT'S
ATTENTION.

THE PARTIES HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY DID DISCUSS THIS DISPUTE, BUT WHAT SEEMS COMPELLING TO THE COURT IS THAT NONE OF THE EXCHANGES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION WOULD QUALIFY AS MEET-AND-CONFER EFFORTS UNDER OUR LOCAL RULES.

THE LOCAL RULES CONTEMPLATE A VERBAL MEETING, NOT AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OR E-MAILS. UNDER CIVIL LOCAL RULE 26.1(A), IT STATES THAT IF COUNSEL HAVE OFFICES IN THE SAME COUNTY, THEY ARE TO MEET IN PERSON. IF COUNSEL HAVE OFFICES IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES, THEY ARE TO CONFER BY TELEPHONE. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THE PARTIES SATISFY THE MEET-AND-CONFER REQUIREMENT BY EXCHANGING WRITTEN CORRESPONDENCE.

AND IT APPEARS, BASED ON WHAT I HAVE BEEN PRESENTED,

THAT THE MEET-AND-CONFER EFFORTS WERE DONE -- TO THE EXTENT
THAT THEY WERE ATTEMPTED, THEY WERE DONE THROUGH WRITTEN
CORRESPONDENCE, NOT THROUGH VERBAL EXCHANGES. SO ON THIS
BASIS, SUBJECT TO THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION, I COULD DENY THE
MOTION OUTRIGHT.

SO SINCE THE PARTIES HAVE DUELING PROCEDURAL

DEFICIENCIES THAT COULD DOOM THEIR CASES, I WILL PROCEED TO

THE MERITS AND GIVE YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS, BUT I

CERTAINLY AM INTERESTED IN THE PARTIES' THOUGHTS ON THE

PROCEDURAL HURDLES AS WELL.

STARTING FIRST WITH INTERROGATORIES 2, 3, 4, 11, 12

AND 16. INTERROGATORY 2 REQUESTS PLAINTIFF'S NORDSTROM'S

PURCHASES. INTERROGATORY 3 REQUESTS PRICE TAGS.

INTERROGATORY 4 REQUESTS PRICE DISCOUNTS ABOVE OR ADJACENT TO

THE ITEMS PURCHASED.

INTERROGATORIES 11 AND 12 DEAL WITH PURCHASE HISTORY
AT NON-NORDSTROM RETAILERS OF ITEMS OF THE SAME BRAND AS
THOSE PURCHASED FROM NORDSTROM. AND INTERROGATORY 16 PERTAINS
TO RETURN INFORMATION FOR NORDSTROM PURCHASES.

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT INTERROGATORIES 2, 3, 4 AND

16, PLAINTIFF WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES -
THE RESPONSES AND STATE THAT THERE ARE NO RETURNS OR NO OTHER

ADS, IF THAT'S THE CASE. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S

REPRESENTATIONS SIMPLY ARE INSUFFICIENT AND WOULD HAVE TO

APPROPRIATELY VERIFY ALL OF THAT CORRECTLY UNDER RULE 33(B).

THE RULES EXPLICITLY PERMIT RAW DATA OR BUSINESS RECORDS TO REPLACE INTERROGATORY ANSWERS. SO THERE IS NOTHING IMPROPER ABOUT PRODUCING THAT RAW DATA RATHER THAN GIVING INTERROGATORY ANSWERS.

IT IS TROUBLING, IF THE ALLEGATION IS TRUE, THAT
PLAINTIFF PROMISED A FULL INVENTORY AND INSTEAD GAVE A RAW
DATA DUMP. AND THAT'S NOT SOMETHING THE COURT CONDONES. BUT
UNDER THE RULES, LOOKING PURELY AT THE DISCOVERY QUESTION,
THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH PRODUCING RAW DATA RATHER THAN
INTERROGATORY ANSWERS.

TURNING TO INTERROGATORIES 11 AND 12, I TENTATIVELY
WOULD FIND THAT -- LOOKING TO THE MERITS HERE, THAT THOSE
NEED TO BE ANSWERED. IF PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN BUYING SIMILAR OR
IDENTICAL PRODUCTS FROM OTHER OUTLETS AT SIMILAR PRICES, THEN
THE CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DECEIVED BY NORDSTROM'S PRICING
POLICIES WOULD BE LESS LIKELY. THEREFORE, THIS INFORMATION
WOULD BE RELEVANT TO NORDSTROM'S DEFENSE.

TURNING NOW TO INTERROGATORIES 5, 6, 7, 9 AND 10.

INTERROGATORY 5 REQUESTS PLAINTIFF TO GIVE THE VALUE OF THE

ITEMS HE PURCHASED IF IT IS DIFFERENT THAN THE PURCHASE

PRICE. INTERROGATORY 6 REQUESTS THE APPROPRIATE COMPARE AT

PRICES. INTERROGATORY 7 REQUESTS THE BASES FOR HIS

APPROPRIATE "COMPARE AT" PRICES. INTERROGATORY 9 REQUESTS

WHAT PLAINTIFF BELIEVES REASONABLE CONSUMERS THINK COMPARE AT

PRICES MEAN. AND INTERROGATORY 10 REQUESTS THE BASES FOR

THAT BELIEF.

DEFENDANT I BELIEVE IS CORRECT THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO THESE INTERROGATORIES, BUT I WOULD TENTATIVELY FIND THAT THE QUESTIONS THEMSELVES ARE IMPROPER. IT APPEARS THAT THE QUESTIONS ARE NOT RELEVANT AND THAT THEY DO REQUEST EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO VALUATION AND REASONABLE CONSUMER BEHAVIOR. SO LOOKING TO THE MERITS OF THOSE, I WOULD TENTATIVELY DENY THE REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTATION.

THE ISSUE TURNS A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY WITH REGARD TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 10, 11, 13, 14 AND 19 THROUGH 23.

FOR THE RECORD, THOSE ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 10, 11, 13 AND 14 SEEK DOCUMENTS

SUPPORTING PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS THAT "COMPARE AT" PRICES

AND PERCENTAGE SAVINGS PRICES WERE DECEPTIVE OR INACCURATE.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTIONS 19 AND 20 SEEK DOCUMENTS

CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS CONCERNING REASONABLE

CONSUMERS' UNDERSTANDING OF COMPARE AT PRICES AND DOCUMENTS

SUPPORTING PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT HE MEETS THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION.

AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 21, 22 AND 23 ASKS FOR ARTICLES, SURVEYS, STUDIES AND RESEARCH THAT PLAINTIFF WILL RELY ON TO SUPPORT HIS CLASS CERTIFICATION CONCERNING COMPARATIVE PRICING'S EFFECT ON CONSUMERS.

THE MAIN DISPUTE HERE APPEARS TO BE OVER REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22, IN WHICH DEFENDANT SPECIFICALLY SEEKS

INFORMATION ON THE MARONICK SURVEY BY PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT,

DR. MARONICK.

2.

AND AS THIS IS VERY LIKELY TO BE MISTRANSCRIBED,

I'LL SPELL THAT OUT FOR THE RECORD. DR. MARONICK IS SPELLED

M, AS IN MICHAEL, M-A-R-O-N-I-C-K.

AND THERE IS ARGUMENT HERE ABOUT WHETHER

DR. MARONICK'S SURVEY AND UNDERLYING INFORMATION IS

PRIVILEGED OR WHETHER THAT PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN WAIVED BECAUSE

IT WAS RELIED ON IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT.

MY TENTATIVE THOUGHTS ON THESE LAST SET OF ISSUES

ARE AS FOLLOWS: I BELIEVE THAT -- PUTTING ASIDE THE MARONICK

SURVEY FOR THE MOMENT, THAT PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO

SUPPLEMENT HIS RESPONSES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE QUESTIONS

ASKED, EVEN IF THE RESPONSE IS AS HE CURRENTLY CLAIMS THAT

THERE IS NOTHING FURTHER TO PRODUCE; AND THAT PLAINTIFF MUST

APPROPRIATELY VERIFY THAT RESPONSE.

IT APPEARS THAT THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION, THESE REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION IN GENERAL ARE PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE RULES.

TURNING FINALLY TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22

REGARDING THE MARONICK SURVEY, DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT THE WORK

PRODUCT PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN WAIVED, AS I MENTIONED EARLIER

BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S DISCLOSURE OF AND RELIANCE ON THAT

SURVEY IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND IN ANOTHER LAWSUIT

AGAINST LEVI STRAUSS.

PLAINTIFF ARGUES THAT IT IS, IN FACT, PRIVILEGED,
BUT I THINK DEFENDANT IS CORRECT THAT THE FACT THAT IT'S
PRIVILEGED IS PRESUPPOSED IN ANY WAIVER ARGUMENT.

AT THIS POINT, BASED ON WHAT'S BEFORE THE COURT, IT

APPEARS THAT ANY PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN WAIVED, AND THAT REQUEST

FOR PRODUCTION 22 WOULD NEED TO BE ANSWERED IN FULL. BUT I

CERTAINLY INVITE THE PARTIES TO ADDRESS THAT IN ORAL ARGUMENT

AS TO RFP 22.

AND AS TO ALL OF THESE POINTS, AS I MENTIONED, THESE ARE MERELY MY TENTATIVE RULINGS. SO I WILL GIVE -- I WILL NOW TURN THE FLOOR OVER TO THE PARTIES. AND SINCE THIS IS NORDSTROM'S MOTION, I WILL GIVE THEM FIRST ARGUMENT.

MS. PEARCE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

WOULD YOU LIKE ME UP AT THE PODIUM?

THE COURT: WHEREVER YOU FEEL MOST COMFORTABLE.

MS. PEARCE.

MS. PEARCE: THANK YOU. GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR.

AS TO THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES, WE DID, IN FACT, HAVE A TELEPHONIC MEET AND CONFER. AFTER THE INITIAL LETTER WAS SENT, THERE WAS A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TO DISCUSS THE DEFICIENCIES WHICH HAD BEEN OUTLINED IN THE LETTER.

THE COURT: WHEN WAS THAT?

MS. PEARCE: THAT OCCURRED -- AVI, DO YOU HAPPEN TO

HAVE THAT? OR -- I'M SORRY. MR. KAUFMAN, DO YOU HAPPEN TO

HAVE THAT?

MS. PEARCE: SURE.

25

AS TO INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 3, DEFENDANT'S VIEW IS THAT IN THIS INSTANCE, A PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS NOT SUFFICIENT IN LIEU OF TESTIMONY OUTLINING THE PURCHASES BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RECORDS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRODUCED AND A TRANSACTION HISTORY WHICH THE LIMITED INFORMATION THAT DEFENDANT HAS RECEIVED HAS ALLOWED IT TO PRODUCE BASED UPON ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S NAME.

AND, FURTHERMORE, THAT THERE IS A PRICE TAG FOR AN ITEM IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR WHICH NO RECEIPT HAS BEEN PRODUCED.

SO IN THIS INSTANCE, THOUGH PERHAPS IN SOME

SO IN THIS INSTANCE, THOUGH PERHAPS IN SOME
SITUATIONS A PRODUCTION OF RECORDS WOULD BE ADEQUATE, WE
DON'T BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THIS CASE AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE
FOR HIS SWORN STATEMENTS OUTLINING HIS PURCHASES.

THE COURT: ARE YOU GOING TO BE DEPOSING HIM?

MS. PEARCE: YES.

THE COURT: AND WHEN IS THAT?

 $\underline{\text{MS. PEARCE}}$: A DATE HAS NOT BEEN SET. WE WERE HOPING TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE BEFORE CONDUCTING THE DEPOSITION.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. PEARCE: I IMAGINE YOU DON'T WANT ME TO DISCUSS
4 AND 16 SINCE I AGREE WITH THE TENTATIVE, OR 11 AND 12,
THOUGH I'D BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY ARGUMENT FROM PLAINTIFF

ON THOSE.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. PEARCE: AS TO INTERROGATORIES 5 TO 7, THE

DEFENDANT'S VIEW IS THAT THESE ARE APPROPRIATE CONTENTION

INTERROGATORIES BECAUSE THEY ASK FOR THE INFORMATION -- THE

FACTS WHICH DEMONSTRATE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT, THE

CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS ABOUT DECEPTION AND RELIANCE AND HIS

HARM.

AND SO IN THAT WAY WE FEEL THAT HIS CONTENTION AS

TO, YOU KNOW, WHAT -- YOU KNOW, IF, IN FACT, IT'S TRUE THAT

HE HAS NOT RETAINED ANY EXPERTS YET ON THESE ISSUES, THEN

PRESUMABLY THERE WAS SOME FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH HE

BELIEVED THAT THESE PRICES WERE DECEPTIVE AND THAT HE HAD

BEEN HARMED. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THAT'S WHAT INTERROGATORIES

5 AND 7 ARE AIMED TO GET AT.

AND INTERROGATORIES 9 AND 10 GO TO THE LEGAL CLAIM

AS IT WAS MADE IN THE COMPLAINT, THE ALLEGATION THAT THESE

PRICES ARE DECEPTIVE TO CONSUMERS. THAT CONTENTION WAS MADE,

AND THIS SEEKS THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE UNDERLYING THAT

CONTENTION.

AND IT'S TRUE, YOU KNOW, IF -- IF, IN FACT,

DR. MARONICK'S WORK WAS A PART OF THAT BASIS FOR WHICH THAT

CONTENTION WAS MADE IN THE COMPLAINT, THEN WE BELIEVE THAT

THOSE FACTS AND EVIDENCE UNDERLYING THAT OPINION MUST BE

DISCLOSED.

AND IN ANY EVENT, THE RESPONSE AS IT IS NOW, WHICH
IS WHAT THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF BELIEVED THE PRICES TO MEAN IS
NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE QUESTION THAT WAS POSED.

THE COURT: I AGREE THAT THE RESPONSE IS NOT ADEQUATE, BUT IT DOES SEEM TO ME, AS I MENTIONED IN MY TENTATIVE, THAT THIS IS REQUESTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON VALUATION AND REGIONAL CONSUMER BEHAVIOR.

AND YOU'RE GETTING SOME OF THIS SAME INFORMATION FROM YOUR REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION --

MS. PEARCE: CORRECT.

THE COURT: -- AREN'T YOU?

MS. PEARCE: YES. THESE ARE IN SOME WAY

DUPLICATIVE. WE'RE REALLY -- THE CONTENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN

MADE IN THE COMPLAINT. SO WE'RE SEEKING THE FACTS -- I MEAN,

UNLESS HE HAS A CONTENTION NOW WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT

MADE IN THE COMPLAINT, WE'RE SEEKING THE FACTS AND THE

EVIDENCE WHICH UNDERLY THAT CONTENTION.

THE COURT: BUT TO THE EXTENT IF HE, HIMSELF, IS NOT AN EXPERT, THEN HE WOULD HAVE TO BE RELYING ON DOCUMENTS, IT SEEMS TO ME, TO COME TO THOSE CONCLUSIONS, AND THOSE WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION; CORRECT?

MS. PEARCE: IF THAT'S THE WHOLE OF THE BASIS FOR

THAT CONTENTION, THEN ABSOLUTELY IT'S COVERED BY RFP 22. BUT

IF IT WEREN'T, WE WOULD WANT THAT TO BE DISCLOSED, IF HE HAD

AN INDEPENDENT FACTUAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THAT

CONTENTION.

THE COURT: AND DID YOU HAVE ANY ARGUMENT ON THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION, OR DID YOU --

 $\underline{\text{MS. PEARCE}}$: WE AGREE WITH THE TENTATIVE ON THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MS. PEARCE.

OKAY. MR. KAUFMAN.

MR. KAUFMAN: THANK YOU, JUDGE SCHOPLER.

IF I CAN BEGIN WITH THE WAIVER ISSUE. I THINK THERE IS TWO ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED. THE FIRST IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS GOOD CAUSE, AND THE SECOND IS WHAT IS THE EFFECT.

AND WE SUBMIT THERE WASN'T. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS GOOD CAUSE, GIVEN THE BACK-AND-FORTH BETWEEN THE PARTIES RELATING TO THE DEFICIENCIES THAT WE PERCEIVED IN DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES.

WE RECEIVED THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION AND THE INTERROGATORIES DURING WHAT ENDED UP BEING A FOUR-AND-A-HALF MONTH MEET AND CONFER, AND, YOU KNOW, IT WAS LOST IN THE SHUFFLE ON OUR END BECAUSE WE SORT OF LOOPED IT WITH THAT ONGOING MEET AND CONFER. SO IT WAS A MISTAKE, BUT IT WAS A WELL-MEANING MISTAKE, YOUR HONOR.

SO WE BELIEVE ON THAT BASIS, THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND GOOD CAUSE. SO EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS --

THE COURT: WELL, WALK ME THROUGH THAT. HOW DOES -I'M NOT SURE HOW ONE HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE OTHER. WHY

WOULD YOU NOT --

MR. KAUFMAN: YOUR HONOR -- YOUR HONOR, IN OUR
CONVERSATIONS, WE WERE JUST TALKING ABOUT DISCOVERY
GENERALLY, AND WE CONTINUOUSLY WORKED EXCHANGING -- WITH
DOCUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THINGS, YOU KNOW, OTHER REQUESTS
OUTWARD AND REQUESTS INWARD.

IT WAS A MISTAKE, YOUR HONOR. THERE IS NOT A GREAT EXPLANATION, BUT THAT'S THE EXPLANATION THAT THERE IS.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT ABOUT WITH REGARD TO

THE VERIFICATION, WHY WOULDN'T THAT SIMPLY HAVE FOLLOWED THE

REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 33(B) REGARDLESS OF WHAT CONVERSATIONS

YOU WERE HAVING WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL?

MR. KAUFMAN: YOUR HONOR, ADMITTEDLY, IT ABSOLUTELY SHOULD HAVE.

I THINK THE CONFUSION OCCURRED BECAUSE MR. BRANCA IS
THE FINANCE DIRECTOR OF THE CITY OF CARLSBAD. THERE IS A
NOTARY IN HIS OFFICE, AND IT IS HER PREFERENCE -NOTWITHSTANDING WHAT WE SENT TO MR. BRANCA WAS AN APPROPRIATE
VERIFICATION, IT WAS HER PREFERENCE TO COMPLETE THIS FORM.

UNTIL I HAD A FULL GRASP OF THE REPLY, I DIDN'T EVEN UNDERSTAND. WE'RE IN THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING IT, AND WE FULLY INTEND TO PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION. AND THERE WAS NO INTENT TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE VERIFICATION.

AGAIN, YOU KNOW, PERHAPS A LITTLE BIT SLOPPY, BUT NOTHING MORE THAN THAT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. KAUFMAN: BUT GOING ON TO THE ISSUE OF EVEN IF
THE COURT WERE TO FIND WAIVER, WHAT THE EFFECT IS. THE

TOWNSEND (PHONETIC) CASE THAT IS CITED BY -- WELL, PUTTING
ASIDE THE TOWNSEND CASE, THE COURT HAS ALREADY FOUND THAT IF
THERE IS A FAILURE TO DISCHARGE THE MEET-AND-CONFER
OBLIGATIONS, THERE IS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR IGNORING -(INAUDIBLE).

BUT EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THERE ISN'T, THE WAIVER WILL BE ONLY AS TO OBJECTIONS. THAT'S THE CASE LAW CITED BY NORDSTROM. THAT'S THE SHEA VS. BEST BUY CASE. AND IT SPECIFICALLY DELINEATES BETWEEN OBJECTIONS AND VALID PRIVILEGES, AND DOESN'T FIND WAIVER OF VALID PRIVILEGES AS A MATTER OF, YOU KNOW, IMMEDIATE HAPPENSTANCE BY THE FAILURE TO TIMELY RESPOND.

NOW, EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THAT THERE
WAS A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS, THIS WOULD ONLY IMPLICATE
INTERROGATORIES 11 AND 12. AND WE DON'T THINK IT WOULD
MATTER MUCH, ONE, GIVEN THE COURT'S TENTATIVE RULINGS; BUT,
TWO, IT'S THE DEFENDANT'S INITIAL BURDEN AND THE PARTY
SEEKING TO COMPEL PRODUCTION INITIAL BURDEN TO ESTABLISH THE
RELEVANCY OF THEIR REQUEST. AND HERE, WE CONTINUE TO CONTEND
THAT INTERROGATORIES 11 AND 12 ARE NOT RELEVANT.

AND ON THIS ISSUE, I JUST WANT TO PREVIEW AN UPCOMING MOTION TO QUASH FOR THE COURT. THE DEFENDANT HAS

SERVED A SUBPOENA ON CITIBANK RELATING TO THE PLAINTIFF'S

TRANSACTION HISTORY FOR SEVEN YEARS FOR ALL ACCOUNTS. NOW,

WE'LL BE FILING A MOTION TO QUASH, SEEKING TO CONTROL THE WAY

IN WHICH THIS PROCESS IS UNDERTAKEN.

BUT I WAS HOPING TO GET FROM YOUR HONOR AT THE END

OF THIS HEARING A TENTATIVE HEARING DATE THAT WE CAN INCLUDE

WITH OUR MOTION, WHICH WE ARE DUE TO FILE THIS AFTERNOON.

BUT I JUST WANTED TO PREVIEW THAT FOR THE COURT AND THEN MOVE

ON TO THE REMAINING ISSUES, UNLESS THE COURT HAS ANY MORE

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WAIVER ISSUE.

THE COURT: NO. WE CAN PROCEED TO THE MERITS.

MR. KAUFMAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

SO MOVING ON TO THE MERITS AS TO INTERROGATORIES 2

AND 3. THE FIRST THING I WANTED TO ADDRESS IS THE TWO

ALLEGED DISCREPANCIES WITH THE TRANSACTION HISTORY. THE

FIRST DISCREPANCY IS APPARENTLY ADDITIONAL PURCHASES TO THE

NAME KEVIN BRANCA. WE'VE INVESTIGATED THIS. WE ARE IN THE

PROCESS OF INVESTIGATING THIS.

IT IS OUR CURRENT UNDERSTANDING FROM THE PLAINTIFF
THAT HIS HUSBAND HAS MADE PURCHASES PERHAPS IN HIS NAME FROM
NORDSTROM. THEY ARE GOING TO A STORAGE FACILITY THAT THEY
MAINTAIN OLD TAX RECORDS AT AND WILL BE LOOKING THROUGH
RECEIPTS THERE TO SEE IF THEY ARE ABLE TO IDENTIFY IN
CONNECTION WITH MR. BRANCA'S HUSBAND'S DOCUMENTS ANY RECEIPTS
REFLECTING HIS PURCHASES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE NAME

OF KEVIN BRANCA EITHER ONLINE OR OTHERWISE.

JUST -- SO THAT'S THE FIRST ALLEGED DISCREPANCY.

AND THE SECOND IS THE THIRD AMENDED -- THE PRICE TAG IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE PRICE TAG IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS AN EXEMPLAR. WE DON'T ALLEGE IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT THAT THE PRICE TAG IS ASSOCIATED WITH A PRODUCT PURCHASED BY MR. BRANCA.

WE DIDN'T INTEND TO ALLEGE THAT. WE WERE JUST
TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE COURT VISUALLY WHAT THE ACCEPTED
COMPARE AT PRICE TAGS LOOKED LIKE. THAT'S THE REASON THAT
THAT HAPPENED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TRANSACTION HISTORY.

NOW, AS TO THE ISSUE OF THE FORM OF THE TRANSACTION HISTORY AND NOT NECESSARILY THE SUBSTANCE, WE -- OUR FIRST UNDERSTANDING CONTINUES TO BE THAT MR. BRANCA HAS MADE TWO PURCHASES OR PURCHASED TWO DIFFERENT TIMES FROM NORDSTROM RACK; AND WE PRODUCED THE COMPLETE RECEIPTS FOR THOSE TWO PURCHASES.

BOTH OF THEM INCLUDE MULTIPLE PRODUCTS AND BOTH OF
THEM PROVIDE ALL OF THE INFORMATION THAT DEFENDANTS HAS
REQUESTED IN REGARDS TO EACH PURCHASE MADE BY MR. BRANCA FROM
NORDSTROM RACK. SO WE BELIEVE THAT THE SUBSTANCE IS ADEQUATE
TO CONVEY THE INFORMATION BEING SOUGHT.

WITH REGARDS TO INTERROGATORIES 4 AND 16, WE HAVE NO PROBLEM AMENDING TO INDICATE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO RETURNS AND NO OTHER ADVERTISEMENTS THAT WERE SEEN BY MR. BRANCA AND

1 PROVIDING A PROFFER OR VERIFICATION THAT COMPLIES WITH 2 RULE 33.

MS. PEARCE: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY BE HEARD -- MAY I
RESPOND TO THE ISSUES THAT WE'VE DISCUSSED THUS FAR, OR SHALL
I WAIT UNTIL WE FINISH?

THE COURT: WELL, MR. KAUFMAN, IF YOU WANT TO HEAR
HER INTERJECTION, I'LL HEAR IT FROM HER; BUT, OTHERWISE, I
GENERALLY PREFER FOR ONE PARTY TO FINISH SPEAKING AND
THEN --

MS. PEARCE: CERTAINLY.

MR. KAUFMAN: YEAH. IF I CAN JUST CONTINUE, GIVEN
THAT I ALLOWED HER --

THE COURT: CERTAINLY.

MR. KAUFMAN: -- HER TO FINISH SPEAKING.

THE COURT: PLEASE CONTINUE.

MR. KAUFMAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

SO GOING TO INTERROGATORIES 11 AND 12, IT'S OUR THEORY, AND IT'S OUR POSITION BASED ON DISCOVERY TO DATE, INCLUDING THE DEPOSITION OF THE NORDSTROM'S CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE, THAT NORDSTROM SELLS CERTAIN PRODUCTS THAT ARE MANUFACTURED EXCLUSIVELY AND SPECIFICALLY FOR NORDSTROM RACK WITH COMPARE AT PRICING.

IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THESE ARE DECEPTIVE AS A MATTER OF FACT BECAUSE THE PRICES DO NOT REFLECT ACTUAL ORIGINAL PRICES OR MSRP'S AT WHICH THE PRODUCTS WERE

PREVIOUSLY SOLD.

IN THAT REGARD, WHETHER OR NOT MR. BRANCA HAS

PURCHASED ANOTHER TOMMY HILFIGER SHIRT ELSEWHERE, EITHER ON

SALE OR OTHERWISE, ISN'T RELEVANT TO THE CONTENTION THAT BY

ADVERTISING A PRICE THAT WAS NEVER A PRICE ASSOCIATED WITH

THE PRODUCT, MR. BRANCA AND PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS PURCHASED

AT NORDSTROM HAS CAUSED A DECEPTION ON THEM.

THE COURT: WELL, IT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO THE CLAIM
THAT MR. BRANCA IS NOT, IN FACT, DECEIVED, THOUGH; RIGHT?

IF THE COMPARE AT PRICE SAYS HE CAN BUY A TOMMY
HILFIGER SHIRT FOR \$30, AND IT'S BEING OFFERED FOR \$35

SOMEWHERE ELSE, AND HE, IN FACT, THAT SAME DAY BOUGHT IT

SOMEWHERE ELSE FOR \$30, HE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DECEIVED BY
THAT AD; RIGHT?

MR. KAUFMAN: YOUR HONOR, THAT WOULD ONLY BE RELEVANT TO THE EXTENT THAT MR. BRANCA PURCHASED THE IDENTICAL PRODUCT THAT HE PURCHASED AT NORDSTROM RACK.

OUR POSITION IS THAT THE IDENTICAL PRODUCTS BEING SOLD AT NORDSTROM RACK WITH "COMPARE AT" THAT WOULD FALL WITHIN THIS DEFINITION WERE NOT SOLD ELSEWHERE, WERE NOT BEING SOLD ELSEWHERE AT THAT PRICE AT THE TIME THAT HE MADE HIS PURCHASES FROM NORDSTROM RACK.

SO UNLESS IT WAS THE IDENTICAL PRODUCT, NO, IT WOULD NOT SATISFY THE INQUIRY.

THE COURT: WELL -- AND JUST TO MAKE SURE THAT WE'RE

TALKING THE SAME LANGUAGE HERE. LET ME GRANT FOR THE MOMENT
THAT IT WAS NOT BEING OFFERED AT THE PRICE, BUT THE QUESTION
ISN'T WHAT PRICE IT WAS BEING OFFERED AT.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER HE, IN FACT, BOUGHT THE IDENTICAL ITEM FROM THE STORE THAT WAS BEING COMPARED AT;

(OVERLAPPING DIALOGUE.)

THE COURT: THE QUESTION IS WHETHER HE PURCHASED THE IDENTICAL ITEM FROM OTHER STORES AND WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF WHAT THEIR ACTUAL PRICING HISTORY IS. ISN'T THAT -- ISN'T THAT --

MR. KAUFMAN: I WOULD AGREE THAT IF THE INQUIRY
WERE, IDENTIFY ALL PRODUCTS IDENTICAL TO THE PRODUCTS YOU
PURCHASED FROM NORDSTROM RACK THAT YOU PURCHASED ELSEWHERE
AND PROVIDE DETAILED, YOU KNOW, TO THE EXTENT AVAILABLE ON
THOSE, I DO AGREE THAT THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT AND WE WOULD
HAVE RESPONDED TO THAT. BUT THAT'S NOT WHAT IS BEING ASKED
FOR HERE, YOUR HONOR.

THEY ARE ASKING FOR MUCH MORE. IN FACT, WHAT THEY
ARE ASKING THE PLAINTIFFS TO DO, AND REALLY THE ONLY LOGICAL
WAY TO ACCOMPLISH IT IS TO OPEN HIS CLOSET AND HIS DRAWERS
AND GO ONE BY ONE THROUGH HIS ITEMS AND SAY, THIS IS A PAIR
OF TOMMY HILFIGER SHORTS, I SUPPOSE PHOTOGRAPH THEM OR MAKE
THEM AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION, AND TRY TO REMEMBER WHERE HE
PURCHASED THEM, WHEN HE PURCHASED THEM, HOW MUCH HE PAID,

WHAT REPRESENTATIONS, YOU KNOW, PRICE OR DISCOUNT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE TO HIM AT THE TIME HE MADE THE PURCHASE AND OTHERWISE.

AND THAT'S JUST UNLIKELY TO YIELD ANYTHING USEFUL FOR ANY PARTY.

THE COURT: CAN HE REQUEST THAT INFORMATION FROM THE COMPETITOR STORES ON HIS PURCHASE HISTORY, IF HE'S USING A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT, FOR EXAMPLE, OR EVEN A PARTICULAR CREDIT CARD?

IT MIGHT BE A WAY OF --

MR. KAUFMAN: BASED ON NORDSTROM'S SEEMING INABILITY

TO BACK END THEIR WAY INTO FIGURING OUT WHAT TRANSACTIONS HE

PURCHASED, I WOULD DOUBT THAT THE COMPETITORS WOULD HAVE

SOMETHING THAT NORDSTROM DIDN'T.

BUT I DON'T -- BUT I DO NOT KNOW THAT WITH ANY

DEGREE OF CERTAINTY, YOUR HONOR. I WOULD BE MERELY

SPECULATING BY SAYING THAT. BUT BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE

DEALING WITH NORDSTROM, I WOULD SAY IT'S UNLIKELY.

THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU.

MR. KAUFMAN: SO MOVING ON TO INTERROGATORIES 5

THROUGH 7 AND 9 AND 10. WE AGREE FULLY WITH THE COURT THAT

THESE ARE REQUESTING EXPERT TESTIMONY.

THE PLAINTIFF ULTIMATELY KNOWS WHAT HE KNOWS AND ISN'T IN A POSITION TO TESTIFY OR TO VERIFY UNDER OATH WHAT HIS EXPERT WILL ULTIMATELY OPINE. WHILE THE PLAINTIFF IS

2.

AWARE THAT THERE WILL BE -- THE PLAINTIFF IS FULLY AWARE THAT
THERE WILL BE EXPERTS ENGAGED TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES.

ADDITIONALLY, WE THINK THAT THE RESPONSES TO THE INTERROGATORIES ARE OTHERWISE SUFFICIENT BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE ALLEGATIONS ALLEGED IN THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT, WHICH THE COURT FOUND SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY RULE (B)9 -- RULE 9(B)-TYPE PLEADING STANDARD.

SO AS A MATTER OF FIRST INSTANCE, THE COURT HAS ALREADY FOUND THAT THESE ARE SUFFICIENT TO SET FORTH THE TYPES OF CLAIMS WHICH DIRECT THE LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY TO ADVISE NORDSTROM OF WHAT THEY ARE TO DEFEND AGAINST AND WHAT THE ALLEGATIONS ARE. AND THAT'S PRECISELY THE SITUATION HERE.

BUT EVEN IF THEY WEREN'T, IT WOULD STILL BE AN INAPPROPRIATE BASIS FOR OBTAINING EXPERT TESTIMONY. AND I SUPPOSE WE CAN ADDRESS THAT NOW WITH REGARDS TO THE MARONICK ITEM, REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22.

OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE NO PROBLEM SUPPLEMENTING OUR
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21 AND 23 TO
INDICATE THAT NOTHING HAS BEEN WITHHELD FROM THOSE REQUESTS.

YOUR HONOR MENTIONED APPROPRIATELY VERIFYING THE RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION, AND I JUST WANT TO UNDERSTAND CONCEPTUALLY WHETHER WE'RE BEING ASKED TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION IN A SIMILAR FORMAT AS INTERROGATORIES TO THOSE REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OR SOMETHING DIFFERENT, AND WHETHER

THE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL WILL BE SUFFICIENT, AS THEY
TYPICALLY ARE?

THAN REQUESTS 1 AND 2.

MR. KAUFMAN: YEAH. YOUR HONOR MAY HAVE

INADVERTENTLY MENTIONED "APPROPRIATELY VERIFIED RESPONSE"

WHEN ASKED THAT PLAINTIFF SUPPLEMENT TO INDICATE THAT THERE

IS NOTHING FURTHER TO PRODUCE TO THE VARIOUS REQUESTS OTHER

THE COURT: AS TO THE REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION?

THE COURT: NO -- YEAH, I MEAN I THINK -- I MAY HAVE SAID APPROPRIATELY VERIFY, BUT IT WOULD BE THE STANDARD FOR REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION ON THAT.

MR. KAUFMAN: OKAY. UNDERSTOOD, YOUR HONOR. SO THANK YOU FOR THE CLARIFICATION.

MOVING ON TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22. SO

THERE IS A DISCONNECT BETWEEN NORDSTROM -- WHAT NORDSTROM

ACTUALLY SEEKS AND WHAT NORDSTROM IS ENTITLED TO.

EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THAT THERE IS A
WAIVER BY PUTTING THE MARONICK SURVEY AT ISSUE IN THE THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND LATER PRODUCING THE MARONICK SURVEY,
WHAT I DON'T THINK CAN BE DISPUTED IS THAT THEY ARE -- THAT
NORDSTROM IS ENTITLED TO NO MORE THAN THEY WOULD BE ENTITLED
TO IF MR. MARONICK WERE A TESTIFYING EXPERT AT THIS STAGE.

THERE HAS BEEN NO WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE THAT WOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH A TESTIFYING EXPERT. THERE WOULD BE NO OBLIGATION TO PRODUCE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN COUNSEL AND THE

EXPERT. THERE WOULD BE NO OBLIGATION TO PRODUCE DRAFTS OF REPORTS OR DRAFTS OF SURVEYS UNDERLYING THE REPORTS THAT WERE MADE EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE BASIS OF PRODUCING THE REPORT.

THESE ARE THE THINGS THAT CONTINUE TO BE PROTECTED,
EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS WAIVER WITH RESPECT TO THE MARONICK
ITEMS AND REQUIRES A MORE FULSOME PRODUCTION IN RESPONSE TO
NO. 22.

HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE <u>PLYDER</u> (PHONETIC) CASE THAT WE CITE IN THE PAPERS, THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CASE, IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF PUT AN EXPERT'S OPINION AT ISSUE VERY EARLY ON IN THE CASE. AND THE COURT DIDN'T HAVE THE NEED TO ADOPT IT. ULTIMATELY, BEFORE THE COURT EVER RULED ON THE SUFFICIENCY OR OTHERWISE RELIED ON IT IN A MATERIAL WAY, THE PLAINTIFF WITHDREW THE EXPERT AND THE DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO COMPEL PRODUCTION.

THE COURT FOUND THAT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO RELIANCE
ON THAT BIT OF EXPERT OPINION THAT WAS ALLEGEDLY PUT AT
ISSUE, THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER PRODUCTION.
WE THINK THAT'S PRECISELY THE ISSUE HERE.

WITH RESPECT TO WHAT THE REASONABLE CONSUMERS

BELIEVED, THE COURT FOUND THAT IT WAS SUFFICIENT FOR

MR. BRANCA TO ALLEGE HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AND TO PROVIDE

HIS OWN ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE NOTION THAT OTHER

REASONABLE CONSUMERS LIKE MR. BRANCA WERE SIMILARLY DECEIVED.

AND THAT'S PRECISELY THE CIRCUMSTANCE HERE.

EVEN THE WORLEY (PHONETIC) CASE THAT NORDSTROM

CITES, WHICH IS THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CASE,

SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROTECTIONS OF RULE 26(B)(4)

CONTINUE TO APPLY EVEN IF THERE IS A WAIVER WITH RESPECT TO A

CONSULTING EXPERT.

WITH THAT, I DON'T BELIEVE I HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER
TO ADDRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE -- UNLESS THERE IS ITEMS
RAISED BY MS. PEARCE'S FURTHER ARGUMENT TO THE COURT OR THE
COURT HAS ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS.

THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. KAUFMAN.

MR. KAUFMAN: THANK YOU.

THE COURT: MS. PEARCE.

MS. PEARCE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: I'M AFRAID YOU'RE TAKING GOOD NOTES.

MS. PEARCE: AS TO OUR FIRST ISSUE ABOUT THE
TIMELINESS OF THE RESPONSES. DEFENDANT'S POSITION WOULD BE
THAT THERE WAS NOT GOOD CAUSE BECAUSE THE MEET AND CONFER
THAT WAS ONGOING AT THAT TIME, AT THE TIME THAT THESE
RESPONSES WERE DUE WAS ABOUT DEFENDANT'S OWN DATA
CAPABILITIES, AND WE FEEL THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT EXPLAINED HOW
THOSE DISCUSSIONS AFFECTED HIS ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE
QUESTIONS WHICH WERE PROPOSED BY DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY
REOUESTS.

AS TO INTERROGATORIES 2 TO 3, WE DO TAKE ISSUE WITH THE ASSERTION THAT THE PRICE TAG IN THE COMPLAINT WAS JUST AN

EXEMPLAR, BECAUSE THE TRANSACTIONAL HISTORY THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ASSEMBLE TO THIS POINT DOES INDICATE THAT THAT PRICE TAG ALIGNS WITH A PURCHASE WHICH WAS MADE BY MR. BRANCA.

AND OBVIOUSLY THIS WILL ALL BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER

TEASING OUT, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS -- THERE IS GOOD

REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE -- THAT THE RECORDS WHICH

HAVE BEEN PRODUCED TO DATE ARE NOT A FULL AND COMPLETE RECORD

OF THE PURCHASES WHICH IS REQUESTED BY THESE INTERROGATORIES.

AS TO INTERROGATORIES 11 AND 12 ABOUT PRODUCTS OF
THE SAME BRANDS PURCHASED FROM OTHER RETAILERS. I KNOW THAT
MR. KAUFMAN'S VIEW IS THAT THIS CASE CONCERNS PRODUCTS WHICH
WERE NOT SOLD ELSEWHERE, BUT THAT FACT HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED AS TO THE PRODUCTS WHICH ARE IN THE COMPLAINT.

AND, YOU KNOW, ASIDE FROM WHETHER IT'S THE -- HIS
VIEW IS THAT ONLY A PURCHASE OF THE IDENTICAL PRODUCT
ELSEWHERE WOULD BE RELEVANT, OUR VIEW IS WE BELIEVE THAT
RELEVANCE IS FOR ONE THING A FAIRLY LOW BAR, BUT ALSO THAT IF
WE SAY THAT -- YOU KNOW, CONSIDER HYPOTHETICALLY WHERE ONE OF
THE PURCHASES AT ISSUE IS A PAIR OF TOMMY HILFIGER PANTS.

IF IT TURNED OUT THAT PLAINTIFF IS AN AVID SHOPPER,
A TOMMY HILFIGER CONNOISSEUR, WHO OWNS 15 PAIRS OF HILFIGER
PANTS, MAYBE SOME ARE IDENTICAL OR VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE
ONES HE PURCHASED AT RACK, HIS BUYING BEHAVIOR, WHATEVER THAT
TURNS OUT TO BE, COULD BE RELEVANT TO A NUMBER OF -- COULD
WEIGH IN A NUMBER OF WAYS ABOUT HIS RELIANCE AND ALSO WHETHER

THE PRICES WERE DECEPTIVE, WHETHER HE WAS, IN FACT, DECEIVED.

FOR EXAMPLE, IF IT SHOWED THAT THE PRICES HE PAID
REGULARLY WERE THE SAME OR VERY CLOSE TO THE COMPARE AT
PRICE, THAT WOULD CERTAINLY TEND TO SUGGEST THAT THE COMPARE
AT PRICE WAS NOT DECEPTIVE.

IF HE HAD NEVER PAID ANYTHING CLOSE TO THE COMPARE AT PRICE FOR A PAIR OF TOMMY HILFIGER PANTS, THAT WOULD ALSO TEND TO SHOW THAT HE WAS AN INFORMED CONSUMER WHO WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE DECEIVED BY A COMPARE AT PRICE WHICH DID NOT ALIGN WITH HIS PAST EXPERIENCE.

OR IF IT JUST HAPPENED TO BE A LOW PRICE COMPARED TO WHAT HE USUALLY PAID, IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE BOUGHT THEM BECAUSE THEY WERE A GOOD DEAL AND HE KNEW INDEPENDENTLY THAT THEY WERE A GOOD DEAL, AND HE DIDN'T RELY ON THE COMPARE AT PRICE.

SO WE THINK THAT HIS EXPERIENCE AS A CONSUMER WITH THESE BRANDS AND WHAT THESE BRANDS SELL FOR GENERALLY, WHAT SIMILAR PRODUCTS SELL FOR GENERALLY, WOULD INFORM HIS STATE OF MIND AND THE ISSUES OF RELIANCE AND DECEPTION.

YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE, AS I BELIEVE HAS BEEN
MENTIONED HERE, YOU KNOW, THIS IS NOT PURE SPECULATION
BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT THIS PLAINTIFF HAS BROUGHT ANOTHER
CONSUMER CLASS ACTION FOR A SIMILAR -- YOU KNOW, WITH SIMILAR
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ANOTHER STORE. SO THE FACT THAT HE'S AN
AVID OR A SAVVY SHOPPER IS NOT OUTSIDE THE REALM OF

POSSIBILITY FOR SURE.

AS TO INTERROGATORIES 5 TO 7, I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE -- WE HAVE MOSTLY DISCUSSED THEM, BUT I -- I DO THINK THAT THE RESPONSES THAT WERE GIVEN ARE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT PRICES BEING DECEPTIVE AND ABOUT WHAT PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE.

BUT RULE 11 REQUIRES THERE TO BE SOME KIND OF

FACTUAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THESE CONCLUSIONS. AND WE

BELIEVE THAT THAT'S WHAT INTERROGATORIES 5 TO 7 ARE SEEKING

TO GET AT, IS SOME KIND OF TANGIBLE, CONCRETE EXPLANATION FOR

WHY HE BELIEVES THAT THESE PRICES THAT HE PAID WERE DECEPTIVE

OR INCORRECT.

AND WHETHER THOSE ALLEGATIONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO

MEET THE STANDARDS OF 9(B), WE THINK THAT THE PLEADING

STANDARD IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE STANDARD IN RESPONDING TO

INTERROGATORIES.

I BELIEVE WE'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED OUR ARGUMENTS

ABOUT INTERROGATORIES 9 AND 10, ABOUT IF THERE ARE FACTS AND

EVIDENCE UNDERLYING MARONICK'S OPINION, WHICH IS THE SOURCE

OF THAT CONTENTION IN THE COMPLAINT, THAT IT SHOULD BE

DISCLOSED.

YOU KNOW, AS TO RFP NO. 22, YOU KNOW, IT'S CLEAR

THAT THE COURT DID RELY ON THE FIVE PAGES OF THESE SURVEY -
THE SURVEY SUMMARY AND RESULTS WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN THE

COMPLAINT.

THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, AS WE NOTED IN FOOTNOTE 3 OF OUR REPLY, PLAINTIFF RELIED UPON THE SURVEY TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED ON THE BASIS THAT HIS ALLEGATIONS HAD NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE PRICE TAGS WERE LIKELY TO DECEIVE REASONABLE CONSUMERS, AND SURVIVED THE LATER MOTION TO DISMISS WITH THE COURT RELYING IN PART UPON SURVEY RESULTS WHICH PURPORTED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 90 PERCENT OF 206 PARTICIPANTS REPORTED INTERPRETING NORDSTROM RACK TAGS IN A CERTAIN WAY.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS HAS DEFINITELY BEEN PLACED -AS THESE CASES THAT WE HAVE CITED HERE, WORLEY, THAT IT HAS
BEEN, QUOTE -- YOU KNOW, THESE OPINIONS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT
INTO THE JUDICIAL ARENA TO THE EXTENT THAT WE OUGHT TO BE
ABLE TO SEE THE UNDERLYING DATA, THE PATTERNS OF -- YOU KNOW,
IF SOMEONE RESPONDED TO ONE QUESTION ONE WAY, HOW DID THAT
INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENT RESPOND TO THE NEXT? WHO WERE THESE
PEOPLE AND HOW WERE THEY FOUND?

AND WE BELIEVE THAT IT'S UNFAIR TO TRY TO SORT OF SELECTIVELY WAIVE THE PRIVILEGE FOR ADVANTAGEOUS INFORMATION AND NOT DISCLOSE THE UNDERLYING INFORMATION.

WE BELIEVE IT'S RELEVANT INDEPENDENTLY AS TO THE

ISSUE OF WHETHER REASONABLE CONSUMERS ARE DECEIVED BY

NORDSTROM RACK'S PRICES. IF THIS PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN WAIVED,

THIS CLOSER INSPECTION OF THE ACTUAL METHODOLOGY COULD VERY

WELL UNDERMINE THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE REACHED AND WHICH
WERE RELIED UPON IN THE COMPLAINT, AS WELL AS POTENTIALLY
PROVIDING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSION.

AND WE KNOW THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL KNOWS WHAT

WE'RE SEEKING HERE BECAUSE IN OTHER CASES IN WHICH THE SAME

COUNSEL HAS BEEN INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES, THEY HAVE SOUGHT THE

SAME INFORMATION FROM DEFENSE'S EXPERTS AND HAVE RECEIVED IT

AND HAVE USED IT TO ARGUE THAT IT SUPPORTED THEIR POSITION.

NOW, OBVIOUSLY NOT ALL, YOU KNOW, COMMUNICATIONS ARE DISCOVERABLE, BUT EVEN AS TO TESTIFYING EXPERTS,

COMMUNICATIONS WHICH REVEAL THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS WHICH WERE COMMUNICATED TO THE EXPERT OR THE FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE EXPERT, THOSE ARE EXCEPTIONS FROM THAT PRIVILEGE WHICH WE THINK WOULD APPLY IN THIS SITUATION AS WELL.

THE COURT: THANK YOU, MS. PEARCE.

MS. PEARCE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER FROM YOU,

MR. KAUFMAN?

MR. KAUFMAN: I THINK I'VE SET FORTH OUR POSITION

PRETTY -- PRETTY COMPREHENSIBLY, UNLESS THE COURT HAS ANY

OUESTIONS BASED ON THE ADDITIONS BY MS. PEARCE.

BUT I WILL NOTE THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
RELIANCE ON THE MARONICK SURVEY, THE COURT INDEPENDENTLY
FOUND THAT ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT

OTHER REASONABLE CONSUMERS MAY HAVE BEEN DECEIVED, AND THAT
WAS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE COMPLAINT.

THERE WERE MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT BASES FOR THE COURT CONCLUDING THAT MR. BRANCA SUFFICIENTLY PLED DECEPTION IN THE SECOND AMENDED AND THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IT WAS NOT LIMITED TO AND NOT NECESSARY THAT THE -- THAT THE SURVEY RESULTS HAD BEEN INCLUDED, BUT NOTWITHSTANDING NORDSTROM'S OWN INTERNAL RECORDS AND OWN INTERNAL PROCEDURES HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THEY INTENDED FOR CONSUMERS TO UNDERSTAND PRECISELY WHAT THE SURVEY RESULTS WERE.

SO TO THE EXTENT THEY WANT TO TAKE ISSUE WITH THOSE RESULTS, ALL THEY ARE TAKING ISSUE WITH IS PRECISELY WHAT THEY WANTED PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND.

THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. KAUFMAN.

MS. PEARCE: I HAVE ONE FURTHER ISSUE, YOUR HONOR; I APOLOGIZE. AND THAT IS THE MATTER OF FEES, WHICH IS THAT DEFENDANT WOULD SEEK FEES IN ASSOCIATION WITH THIS MOTION, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE SOME OF THESE ISSUES ABOUT VERIFICATION AND, YOU KNOW, GETTING RESPONSES WHICH HAVE EVIDENTIARY VALUE, WE THINK SHOULD NOT HAVE REQUIRED A MOTION TO RESOLVE.

THE COURT: WELL, I'M GOING TO --

(OVERLAPPING DIALOGUE.)

THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. KAUFMAN. I DIDN'T MEAN TO CUT YOU OFF.

MR. KAUFMAN: I WAS JUST GOING TO SAY, WE OBVIOUSLY
DISAGREE WITH THAT NOTION. WE BELIEVE THERE WAS A GOOD-FAITH
BASIS FOR ANY DISPUTES THAT HAVE SURVIVED UNTIL THIS POINT
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF, YOU KNOW, THE ONES THAT WE'RE STILL IN
THE PROCESSING OF RESOLVING.

AND WE BELIEVE AN ADDITIONAL OR MORE COMPLETE MEET

AND CONFER WOULD HAVE RESOLVED, ABSENT THE NEED FOR A MOTION

SO THE PREMATURE FILING OF THE MOTION HAS RESULTED IN FEES

THAT WERE OTHERWISE UNNECESSARY AND ADVERSE AND NOT

NECESSARILY PLAINTIFF'S ACTS.

THE COURT: I'M GOING TO TAKE A RECESS AND LOOK OVER
THESE MATTERS ONE LAST TIME. AND I'LL BE OUT AND ISSUE MY
RULING.

THANK YOU.

(RECESS, 2:46 P.M. TO 3:00 P.M.)

 $\underline{\text{THE COURT}}\colon \ \text{ALL RIGHT.} \ \text{THIS IS MY THINKING ON THIS}$ Case after much consideration.

I BELIEVE THAT MS. PEARCE HAS ADEQUATELY

DEMONSTRATED THAT NORDSTROM DID CONDUCT A VERBAL MEET AND

CONFER. I THINK THAT, ADDED TO THE EXTENSIVE WRITTEN

CORRESPONDENCE, SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LOCAL RULES

IN TERMS OF DOING A MEET AND CONFER BEFORE SEEKING THE

COURT'S INTERVENTION WITH A MOTION.

WITH REGARD TO OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES THAT WE DISCUSSED, I FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT SHOWN GOOD

CAUSE FOR ALL THESE PROCEDURAL DEFECTS; IN PARTICULAR, THE FAILURE TO VERIFY APPROPRIATELY. I JUST DON'T FIND THAT THERE IS A GOOD CAUSE FOR THAT. BUT I DO AGREE WITH MR. KAUFMAN, THAT THAT WOULD NOT WAIVE ANY PRIVILEGES THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WOULD HAVE.

BASED ON THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE, I WOULD GRANT THE MOTION TO COMPEL WITH REGARD TO ALL OF THE REQUESTED INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22.

AND AS TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22, WHICH IS THE MARONICK SURVEY, LET ME PUT FORTH ON THE RECORD THE WAY I ANALYZE THAT ISSUE.

IT APPEARS THAT DR. MARONICK IS NOT GOING TO BE
TESTIFYING AT TRIAL AND APPARENTLY WAS ORIGINALLY RETAINED AS
A CONSULTING EXPERT AND THEREFORE WOULD NORMALLY BE PROTECTED
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(B)(4)(D).

BUT ONCE THAT EXPERT IS PUT INTO THE RECORD, THE

CASE LAW STATES THAT THE EXPERT LOSES THAT CONSULTING EXPERT

PROTECTION AND BECOMES ESSENTIALLY A TRIAL PREPARATION

WITNESS.

THIS RULE MAKES SOME PUBLIC POLICY SENSE BECAUSE

OTHERWISE IT MIGHT INCENTIVIZE PARTIES TO RELY ON EXPERTS IN

THE RECORD FOR PURPOSES OF AVOIDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT THEY KNEW THERE WERE

PROBLEMS WITH, AND THEN THEY COULD SIMPLY REMOVE THEM, SAY

THEY WEREN'T PLANNING ON RELYING ON THEM AS TRIAL WITNESSES,

AND THEREFORE AVOID TURNING OVER UNDERLYING DATA OR

INFORMATION THAT MIGHT UNDERCUT THEIR FINDINGS.

SO I FIND IN THIS CASE THAT DR. MARONICK HAS LOST HIS ROLE AS A CONSULTING EXPERT; BUT THAT DOES NOT END THE INQUIRY. EVEN IF HE'S CONSIDERED TO BE A TRIAL PREPARATION -- OR TRIAL WITNESS, THE DRAFT -- ANY DRAFT EXPERT REPORTS THAT HE WROTE WOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(B)(4)(B).

SO I WOULD -- AND COMMUNICATIONS WOULD GENERALLY BE PROTECTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(B)(4)(C), WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THREE AREAS OF COMMUNICATIONS THAT ARE EXCEPTED BY THAT RULE.

SO AS TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22, I WILL ORDER THAT ALL OF THE CATEGORIES IDENTIFIED IN THAT REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION BE TURNED OVER. THE ONE EXCEPTION WOULD BE AT THE END, THERE IS A REQUEST FOR ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH DR. MARONICK. AND I WOULD ORDER THAT THOSE ARE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(B)(4)(C) AS TO THOSE THREE CATEGORIES.

AND THOSE WOULD BE ANY COMMUNICATIONS, NO. 1,
RELATING TO COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPERT STUDY OR TESTIMONY;
NO. 2, COMMUNICATIONS IDENTIFYING FACTS OR DATA THAT THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEY PROVIDED AND THAT THE EXPERT CONSIDERED IN

FORMING THE OPINIONS TO BE EXPRESSED; AND, 3, COMMUNICATIONS
THAT IDENTIFY ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY PROVIDED
AND THAT THE EXPERT RELIED ON IN FORMING THE OPINIONS TO BE
EXPRESSED. BUT OTHERWISE COMMUNICATIONS WOULD BE PROTECTED.

AND AS I STATED EARLIER, ANY DRAFT EXPERT REPORTS
WOULD BE PROTECTED AS WELL FROM DISCLOSURE. OTHERWISE, I
WOULD GRANT THE MOTION TO COMPEL WITH RESPECT TO REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION NO. 22.

FINALLY, TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS. I AM
TRYING TO GIVE EVERY, YOU KNOW, BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT HERE TO
PLAINTIFF, BUT I HAVE A HARD TIME GETTING PAST THE FACT THAT
AT LEAST AS TO THE VERIFICATION WHICH WAS MENTIONED IN
CORRESPONDENCE, BOTH OF THE ISSUES, BOTH OF THE DEFICIENCIES
WERE MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, AND TO THIS DATE, IT'S
STILL INSUFFICIENT AS OF TODAY'S DATE. I HAVE A HARD TIME
FINDING THAT THE MOTION WAS NOT -- OR THAT THE OPPOSITION WAS
SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED.

SO I WOULD FIND THAT SOME SANCTION OR FEES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. I WILL DISCOUNT IT, HOWEVER, BY -- FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH BY MR. KAUFMAN, WHICH I FIND DON'T AMOUNT TO A LEGAL -- LEGAL GOOD CAUSE, BUT DO, I THINK, MITIGATE THE THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS HERE.

WHAT I WILL REQUEST, MS. PEARCE, IS THAT NORDSTROM PROVIDE ME A STATEMENT OF THEIR FEES IN CONNECTION WITH BRINGING THIS MOTION.

AND HOW MUCH TIME DO YOU THINK YOU'LL NEED TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH THAT ACCOUNTING?

MS. PEARCE: IS ONE WEEK PERMISSIBLE?

THE COURT: ONE WEEK WOULD BE FINE. WE'LL GIVE YOU UNTIL CLOSE OF BUSINESS -- UNTIL JUNE 21ST TO FILE THAT WITH THE COURT.

AND AFTER RECEIVING THAT, I'LL MAKE A FINAL

DETERMINATION ABOUT WHAT FEES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT

OF MR. KAUFMAN'S ARGUMENTS.

ANYTHING FURTHER FROM THE PARTIES?

MR. KAUFMAN: YES, YOUR HONOR.

I PREVIEWED PREVIOUSLY THE ISSUE OF THE MOTION TO

QUASH THE SUBPOENA ON CITIBANK. I WAS HOPING TO SECURE A

HEARING DATE ON THAT SO THAT WE COULD GO AHEAD AND FILE OUR

MOTION AND PROVIDE THAT IN THE NOTICE OF MOTION TO THE EXTENT

REQUIRED; OR IF YOUR HONOR PREFERS A DIFFERENT PROCEDURE,

LIKE A LETTER PROCEDURE AS WE'VE UNDERTAKEN WITH THIS MOTION

TO COMPEL. WE'RE HAPPY TO APPROACH IT IN THAT FASHION AS

WELL.

THE COURT: YOU BOTH HAVE MADE ME RECONSIDER MY

LETTER BRIEFING PROCEDURE. I DIDN'T KNOW HOW EXTENSIVE THAT

CAN BE. OR AT A MINIMUM, I MAY HAVE TO IMPOSE PAGE LIMITS OR

SOMETHING IN THE FUTURE.

I'M NOT -- I'M NOT ADMONISHING EITHER OF YOU ABOUT
THAT, BUT YOU CERTAINLY WERE ABLE TO CRAM A LOT OF ARGUMENT

THE COURT: YEAH. ALL RIGHT.

MR. KAUFMAN: I HAVE ONE LAST POINT OF

CLARIFICATION, YOUR HONOR, AND I'M NOT SURE, IT'S PROBABLY MY

CONFUSION IN MY NOTES.

I JUST WANT TO CONFIRM THAT THE EXTENT OF THE

CARVE-OUT FROM REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 22, THE MARONICK

REQUEST, WHETHER IT INCLUDES SOLELY THE COMMUNICATIONS EXCEPT

FOR THOSE LISTED IN THE RULE, OR THOSE COMMUNICATIONS AND

DRAFT REPORTS WHICH THE COURT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED ARE

PRIVILEGED?

THE COURT: RIGHT. SO I'M REQUESTING THAT

EVERYTHING THAT'S REQUESTED IN RFP 22 BE TURNED OVER, WITH

TWO EXCEPTIONS. ONE IS THE COMMUNICATIONS. THE

COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD NOT BE TURNED OVER, EXCEPT TO THE

EXTENT THAT I STATED, THOSE THREE EXCEPTIONS IN THE RULE, AND

NO DRAFT EXPERT REPORTS SHOULD BE TURNED OVER.

 $\underline{\text{MR. KAUFMAN}}\colon$ THANK YOU FOR THE CLARIFICATION, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: CERTAINLY.

MR. KAUFMAN: I'M SORRY IF I MISUNDERSTOOD.

THE COURT: NO, NO PROBLEM. I WANT TO MAKE SURE IT'S CLEAR FOR EVERYONE.

AND BEFORE I LET YOU ALL GO, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE

THAT I SHOULD BE UPDATED ON IN THE CASE? I REMAIN INTERESTED

IN THE CASE OBVIOUSLY AS IT CONTINUES ON AND CERTAINLY IN

39 1 TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AT SOME POINT AS WELL. 2 SO IF THERE IS ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT TO LET ME KNOW 3 ABOUT, I'D BE HAPPY TO HEAR IT. 4 MR. KAUFMAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 5 MS. PEARCE: NOT AT THIS TIME, YOUR HONOR. 6 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. WELL, THANK YOU VERY 7 MUCH FOR THE ARGUMENT AND THE BRIEFING. AND I GUESS I'LL SEE 8 YOU BOTH AGAIN ON JULY 26TH. 9 MS. PEARCE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. TAKE CARE. 11 MR. KAUFMAN: THANK YOU. 12 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 3:12 P.M.) 13 -- 00000 --14 I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE 15 16 ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER. 17 /S/CAMERON P. KIRCHER 6-22-17 18 TRANSCRIBER 19 20 21 22 23 24 25